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Abstract
Background: Mandatory notification of invasive methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infections was
introduced for laboratories in Germany in 2009. The aims were to support local health authorities (LHAs) in their
mandate to prevent and control infections in hospitals and to improve population-based nationwide surveillance of
healthcare associated infections. We evaluated the MRSA surveillance system to assess whether its aims were met
and to identify areas for improvement.
Methods: Using the updated guidelines for evaluating public health surveillance systems by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention we assessed the attributes simplicity, timeliness, data quality, acceptability, and
usefulness. In 2016/2017 we interviewed staff in LHAs, state health authorities (SHAs), and laboratories and analyzed
surveillance data of cases notified between 2009 and 2016.
Results: We interviewed 10% of LHAs (n = 38), 63% of SHAs (n = 10), 5 selected laboratories and analyzed
information on 27,706 notified MRSA cases. LHAs reported that on receiving notifications from laboratories they
contacted hospitals for clinical information, which was time-consuming and complicated as physicians were hard to
reach or refused to answer questions, citing doctor-patient confidentiality. LHAs suggested reducing the amount of
information collected as some clinical information was unnecessary for implementing control measures. LHAs
stated that they received notifications on time, however surveillance data analysis showed some delay. Data
completeness exceeded 90% for most variables, however it was only 68% and 80% for dates of disease onset and
hospital admission respectively making it impossible to discriminate between hospital and community acquired
infections in half of the cases. The surveillance system was well accepted by half of the interviewees. A third
however stated that the benefits of the surveillance system were outweighed by the work associated with it. The
majority rated the system to be useful for recognizing trends in the MRSA incidence and the ability to check up on
infection control measures in hospitals.
Conclusions: The surveillance system proved to be useful by fulfilling its aims. It was timely, acceptable and
provided complete data for most variables. However, the system was complicated; ensuring that only relevant
variables are reported could simplify the system without losing any of its usefulness.
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Background
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is
the multidrug-resistant pathogen that most frequently
causes hospital acquired infections in Germany [1, 2].
One mechanism to control communicable diseases is the
implementation of effective surveillance systems. Surveil-
lance enables the identification of temporal and regional
trends, the evaluation of the effects of interventions, and
thereby allows the implementation of effective infection
prevention and control (IPC) measures and raises aware-
ness of public health problems [3].
Germany introduced mandatory notification for inva-
sive MRSA infections for laboratories in 2009. The new
MRSA surveillance was integrated into the statutory
notifiable diseases surveillance system. The aims of the
MRSA surveillance are to improve nationwide surveil-
lance of healthcare associated infections by introducing
population-based MRSA surveillance and to strengthen
local health authorities (LHAs) in their capacity to ef-
fectively prevent and control healthcare associated infec-
tions [4]. However, it has been questioned whether or
not this surveillance system actually contributes to the
prevention of nosocomial infections [5]. In addition,
periodical evaluations of surveillance systems are crucial
in order to ensure that systems fulfill their aims and to
implement improvements as required [6–8]. The Ger-
man surveillance system for MRSA has not yet been
evaluated in detail.
We evaluated the surveillance system for invasive
MRSA infections by analyzing surveillance data and by
interviewing key users of the system including staff in
LHAs, state health authorities (SHAs), and laboratories
to assess whether aims of the system are being met and
to identify areas for potential improvement.
Methods
Evaluation
We used methods described in the updated guidelines for
evaluating public health surveillance systems by the Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which we
modified to fit the surveillance system under evaluation
[8] (Table 1). We engaged key stakeholders (at SHAs,
LHAs, and the national public health institute, the Robert
Koch-Institute (RKI)) in the development of the study
design and of a questionnaire. We assessed the attributes
simplicity, data quality, timeliness, acceptability, and use-
fulness. The evaluation was divided into two parts. First,
we interviewed staff from LHAs, SHAs, and laboratories
using a semi-structured questionnaire, which contained
open and closed questions. Second, we analyzed surveil-
lance data of cases notified between 2009 and 2016.
Selection of participants and interviews
We recruited SHAs by asking them at a meeting whether
they would participate in the study and sent out informa-
tion afterwards. In order to recruit LHAs, we asked SHAs
to forward an invitation and information sheet about the
study to the LHAs in their federal states. We planned to
interview 2 to 5 LHAs per federal state depending on the
population size. If more than the planned number of
LHAs per state were interested in participating in the
study, we selected LHAs by including a balanced number
Table 1 Methods and measures used for assessing attributes of statutory MRSA surveillance, Germany 2016/2017 (based on CDC
guidelines)
Attribute Methods Measures and questions used to assess the attribute
Simplicity Interviews • Description of the surveillance system
• Amount and type of data on cases
(for case definition and other data)
• Method of data collection including number
and types of reporting sources
• Time for collecting and managing the data (e.g. data entry)
Timeliness Data analysis and interviews • Time elapsed between diagnosis and notification
and between notification and data transmission
Data quality Data analysis and interviews • Completeness of surveillance data
• Presence of data quality checks
Acceptability Data analysis and interviews • Quantitative measures: reporting rate, data completeness,
completion rate of investigations, timeliness
• Perceived public health relevance of disease
• Dissemination of aggregated data to interested parties
• Assessment of effort in relation to usefulness of the system
• Statutory requirements for reporting and data collection
Usefulness Interviews • Does the system contribute to a timely implementation
of prevention and control measures?
• Does the system provide estimates for morbidity?
• Does the system detect trends?
• Does the system lead to improved clinical practices?
• Assessment of usefulness on 1 to 10 scale
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of LHAs in urban and rural districts, with small and large
population sizes, and with high and low incidence of noti-
fied invasive MRSA infections. In addition, LHAs were
asked to provide names of notifying laboratories in their
district during the interviews and a convenience sample of
five laboratories from differently sized districts was sched-
uled for interviews.
The semi-structured phone interviews with represen-
tatives of LHAs, SHAs and laboratories were conducted
by two researchers where possible. Interviewees were
asked for consent to be re-contacted in case a clarifica-
tion of their responses was required.
Data analysis
Data analysis was conducted for all electronically trans-
mitted cases of invasive MRSA infections notified to the
Robert Koch Institute between 2009 and 2016 which
met the surveillance case definition. Data were extracted
from the electronic surveillance database SurvNet@RKI
[9] on March 2nd, 2017 and subsequently analyzed using
Excel (Microsoft Excel 2010) and Stata (StataSE 14).
Data was considered to be complete if “yes”, “no”, or a
date was specified for a variable. If LHAs had indicated
that a result was either not investigated or could not be
ascertained, data was considered to be incomplete.
Confidentiality and ethical statement
Participation in the interviews was voluntary and inter-
viewees’ personal data (name of interviewee, name of
LHA, federal state, etc.) were pseudonymized. Surveil-
lance data contained only variables as required by the
German Infection Protection Act. Only aggregated data
are published in the results.
Results
Between June 2016 and January 2017, we interviewed
representatives of 38 LHAs (10% of all LHAs), 10 SHAs
(63% of all SHAs), and 5 laboratories. Furthermore, we
analyzed data of 27,706 cases of invasive MRSA infec-
tion notified between 2009 and 2016.
Description of the system
The surveillance system for invasive MRSA infections is
integrated into the statutory notification system regu-
lated by the German Infection Protection Act. It is a
comprehensive, passive, case-based surveillance system
requiring laboratories to notify MRSA detected in blood
or cerebrospinal fluid (CSF). The case definition includes
laboratory-confirmed cases irrespective of the clinical
presentation [10]. Laboratory confirmation requires the
culture of S. aureus from blood or CSF and the detection
of methicillin resistance either by susceptibility testing
or detection of the mecA gene [11].
LHAs should be notified by laboratories about a case
of invasive MRSA infection within 24 h. Notifications
are usually paper-based and must include but are not
limited to demographic information on the patient as
well as type and result of the diagnostic tests. LHAs then
enter the data into an electronic database and transmit
pseudonymized data supplemented by information on
clinical presentation and outcome, date of disease onset,
and mode of transmission electronically to their SHA
within one workday. If available, additional information
on the focus of the infection such as invasive devices
and catheters, trauma, or other localizations of MRSA
infections should also be collected and transmitted. The
data is then transmitted electronically by the SHA to the
RKI within the next workday (Fig. 1) [12].
According to the Infection Protection Act, laboratories
are obliged to make the notification to the LHA respon-
sible for the district from where the sample was sent to
the laboratory, which is usually a hospital. The Infection
Protection Act also states that the LHA responsible for
the district of the patient’s residence is in charge of
transmitting the data to their SHA. If the patient’s resi-
dence and the hospital are in two different districts, the
LHA receiving the notification and the LHA in charge
of transmitting the data to the SHA are not the same. In
this situation the first LHA (hospital-LHA) has to for-
ward the notification to the second LHA (patient-LHA).
There is no legal regulation as to which LHA has to in-
vestigate clinical presentation and focus of infection with
the hospital.
Simplicity
All laboratories reported the notification process to be
simple and quick as it had been largely automatized. No-
tification forms were mostly faxed or, by one laboratory,
Fig. 1 Flow-chart on notification and case investigation processes
for laboratory notifications of hospital patients according to the
German Infection Protection Act
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sent by mail to the LHA. Once the notification form had
arrived at the LHA, data was entered into the electronic
database. Subsequently either health inspectors (73%; 27
of 37 LHAs), physicians (16%; 6 of 37 LHAs), or other
staff members (11%; 4 of 37 LHAs) collected informa-
tion that had not been available in the laboratory notifi-
cation form. This included variables such as clinical
presentation or the focus of the MRSA infection. They
also checked whether prevention and control measures
had been implemented in the hospital. Specific data
collection forms for the investigation of invasive MRSA
infections were used by 84% of LHAs (32 of 38). These
were either sent to the hospital or used during a tele-
phone interview. LHAs investigated either by email,
mail, or fax (51%; 19 of 37) or by phone (49%; 18 of 37).
People contacted for this purpose included the treating
physician (92%; 34 of 37), the IPC team of the hospital
(76%; 28 of 37), and the patients and their families (16%;
6 of 37) (multiple answers were possible). About a third
of LHAs (36%; 13 of 36) reported that some hospitals in
their districts sent all the required information on their
own initiative after they had been alerted by the labora-
tory about a case of an invasive MRSA infection without
requiring any further queries from the LHAs.
Applying the case definition was perceived as simple
by most of the interviewees in LHAs; some reported that
there had been some difficulties during the initial phase
of the surveillance. Two LHAs stated that health inspec-
tors found it difficult to interpret laboratory reports and
that in their opinion physicians should conduct the in-
vestigations with laboratories and hospitals. Three LHAs
reported that the clinical presentation or the cause of
death was not always clear. About half of the LHAs re-
ported investigations to take longer than 30 min and
data collection longer than 3 days to complete (Fig. 2).
They reported the following reasons for delays in com-
pleting the investigations: physicians in the hospitals
were hard to reach, especially if hospitals in other dis-
tricts were involved; physicians sometimes did not an-
swer the questions due to time constraints or due to
misled doctor-patient confidentiality concerns; or pa-
tients had already been discharged at the time of the
case investigation often due to delayed notifications by
the laboratory. Several LHAs suggested omitting clinical
variables relating to symptoms or the focus of the infec-
tion as these were often laborious and time-consuming
to collect.
When patients were hospitalized in another district
than their place of residence, 32% (12 of 38) of the
hospital-LHAs (LHA of the district where the hospital is
located) conducted the case investigations in the hospi-
tals themselves, 5% (2 of 38) decided on a case-by-case
basis which LHA had to investigate, and 63% (24 of 38)
forwarded the notification forms to the patient-LHA




All laboratories reported that they sent out notifications
on the day the diagnosis was confirmed. However, one
laboratory sent notifications forms by regular mail,
which can take longer than 1 day. 86% (32 of 37) of
LHAs reported that they received the notifications on
the day of or the day following diagnosis. Analysis of
surveillance data showed that median duration from
diagnosis to the receipt of the notification at LHAs was
2 days (Table 2). Although delayed notifications were
not specifically identified by LHAs as an issue in terms
of implementation of control measures, some did report
that this could mean that data collection in hospitals
was difficult or impossible.
Notification to data entry and data entry to arrival at RKI
Median duration from the receipt of a notification to its
entry in the electronic system at the LHAs was less than
1 day and from data entry to arrival of data at RKI 1 day
(Table 2). Data transmission from LHAs to SHAs within
24 h was reported by 60% of SHAs (6 of 10). Three
SHAs reported that a few LHAs did not transmit data
daily when there were staff shortages, when LHAs
wanted the data to be complete before entering the case
into the database, or when two LHAs were involved in
investigations and forwarding of notification forms be-
tween LHAs was prolonged.
Fig. 2 Time spent by LHAs on case investigations of notified MRSA cases; interviews with LHAs 2016/2017, Germany (n = 36)
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Data quality
Data completeness
Data completeness of the 27,706 cases notified between
2009 and 2016 reached 96% to 100% for variables related
to demographic characteristics and clinical presentation.
Data completeness for diagnostic methods was 95% for
the “sample type” for the whole period and improved
markedly for “type of susceptibility testing” from 11% in
2009 to 95% in 2016. Apart from date of death, date var-
iables were often not specified: the date of disease onset
and the date of hospital admission had been specified
for 68% and 80% of the cases respectively; and for only
56% both date variables had been specified. Complete-
ness of additional information like symptoms and risk
factors could not be assessed as a checkbox option
“none” was not provided for these variables.
Data quality management
Quality checks were performed by 97% of LHAs (36 of
37) on the data entered into the database. All LHAs (36
of 36) tried to identify and delete duplicate notifications
by either automatic or manual procedures. Additional
quality checks were reported to be conducted by 72% of
LHAs (26 of 36); most of them specified that the respon-
sible SHAs checked for missing or implausible data. The
majority of SHAs (70%; 7 of 10) reported that they per-
formed these quality checks on every single case.
Acceptability
According to an analysis of the surveillance data, since
2009 all but one LHA had transmitted at least one case
of invasive MRSA infection. Case investigations could
not always be completed by 15% of LHAs (5 of 33). This
was partially due to the fact that doctors felt that they
would breach doctor-patient confidentiality if they pro-
vided the required information. Delayed notifications
made it also more difficult to collect all the data as pa-
tient charts were no longer easily accessible. Some inter-
viewees commented that the workload associated with
the investigation of invasive MRSA infections was justi-
fied given the severity of the disease. Aggregated data
was disseminated to interested parties by LHAs, but one
laboratory stated that it would be useful to get feedback
on the conclusions drawn from the data. Most LHAs
(86%; 32 of 37) reported that they were able to collabor-
ate well with hospitals. The majority of SHAs and LHAs
stated that the benefits of the surveillance system were
worth the workload associated with investigating cases
of invasive MRSA infections (Fig. 3).
Usefulness
According to LHAs and SHAs the usefulness of the
system was partly due to the epidemiological data it de-
livered so that trends could be identified. Some respon-
dents stated that notified invasive MRSA infections were
a good proxy indicator for trends in all MRSA infections
or even colonizations, conversely others voiced the opin-
ion that the system only detected the “tip of the iceberg”
and that the true burden could not be estimated using
notified cases. Almost all interviewees (76% of LHAs
and 90% of SHAs) analyzed their data, although some
LHAs stated that they had too few cases to conduct any
further analysis for MRSA only. Most interviewed sites
(90%; 43 of 48) made use of published surveillance data,
48% using data from their federal state and 54% using
national data published by RKI (multiple answers were
possible). They either used the data for routine reports,
Table 2 Timeliness of notification and data transmission of notified MRSA cases; Germany 2009–2016
Median [days] IQRa [days]
Diagnosis to notification (n = 1530) 2 1;4
Notification to data entry at LHA (n = 2245) 0 0;0
Data entry at LHA to data arrival at RKI (n = 2245) 1 1;2
a IQR: interquartile range
Fig. 3 Balance of effort and usefulness of the surveillance system for invasive MRSA infections in Germany; interviews with SHAs and LHAs
2016/2017 (n = 45)
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for queries from press or policy makers, or to inform
local networks for control of antimicrobial resistance.
Another benefit reported by LHAs was that LHAs
took action following notifications and provided advice
regarding control measures where required. However,
some LHAs also reported that additional advice from
their side was usually not required as they already knew
which hospitals had hygiene guidelines and whether they
were being followed. Some LHAs performed inspections
of hospital wards when a case had been notified but
most of them only did this in response to clusters of
MRSA cases which rarely were invasive infections
(Fig. 4). Two LHAs reported that they had detected
hygiene deficiencies due to notified invasive MRSA in-
fections. LHAs used case investigations following notifi-
cations to assess whether hospitals were complying with
hygiene guidelines. This was reflected in the data collec-
tion forms, most of which (84%) contained questions re-
garding mode of transmission or prevention and control
measures. Several LHAs reported that case investiga-
tions led to an intensified contact to hospitals, a better
collaboration in terms of hygiene, and a better accept-
ance of prevention measures from the hospitals.
On a scale of 1 to 10 for the usefulness of the system,
LHAs allocated a median of 7 points (range 2 to 10) and
SHAs 6.75 points (range 2 to 10) to the surveillance
system.
Discussion
We conducted the first detailed evaluation of the Ger-
man mandatory surveillance system for invasive MRSA
infections including interviews with stakeholders and an
analysis of surveillance data. We found that overall the
aims of the system were met. However, by assessing the
individual attributes of surveillance systems as recom-
mended by the guidelines of the CDC [8], we also identi-
fied some areas for improvement (Table 3).
The MRSA surveillance aims to improve surveillance
of healthcare associated infections and provides nation-
wide and mostly complete data on the epidemiology of
invasive MRSA infections. This information is used
to inform members of local networks for control of
antimicrobial resistance, policy makers, and the pub-
lic. The second aim, which is to support LHAs in
preventing and controlling healthcare associated in-
fections, is met by providing an additional opportun-
ity for LHAs to check on measures undertaken in
hospitals. MRSA surveillance had also led to a closer
collaboration between LHAs and hospitals and might
contribute towards better compliance with guidelines
on infection prevention and control in hospitals.
However, when LHAs conduct case investigations in
hospitals in other districts (because their resident is hos-
pitalized in a different district), they cannot check on in-
fection control measures in these hospitals as they have
no regulatory supervision over these hospitals (according
to the Infection Protection Act). In order to avoid this
problem we recommend that LHAs of the district of the
hospitals investigate and check on control measures if
necessary and then forward the information to the
patient-LHA for data transmission to the SHA. The
results of this evaluation will inform the development of
a new electronic reporting system with a particular focus
on improving the exchange of data and the collaboration
between LHAs.
Though the system was assessed to be useful, we
found it to be complicated, resulting in a considerable
workload for data collection by LHAs. Collecting data in
hospitals was perceived to be labor intensive and
time-consuming by many LHAs with almost half of the
interviewed LHAs requiring more than 30 min for each
case investigation. When the system was introduced, an
average 26 min were estimated to be necessary for man-
aging a case and 2000 cases were expected annually [4].
As currently about 3000 cases are notified annually, the
resulting workload is considerably higher than estimated.
Reducing the amount of data to be collected per case
would address this. Several LHAs suggested that infor-
mation on symptoms and focus of infection was un-
necessary. They felt this information was difficult to
ascertain and that it was not used by the LHAs. Omitting
these variables might help making the system simpler and
less resource-intensive and improve acceptability without
reducing its usefulness.
Fig. 4 Actions taken by LHAs following notifications of invasive MRSA infections in Germany; interviews with LHAs 2016/2017 (n = 38)
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Another approach to simplify data collection would be
to provide the IPC team of the hospital with data collec-
tion forms which they could complete independently
and submit to the LHAs. However, some LHAs consid-
ered speaking directly to the affected wards useful. LHAs
will need to individually find a balance between the sim-
plest way of data collection and the need for dialogue
with the hospital.
A significant barrier to data collection was the refusal
by some physicians to share detailed information due to
concerns around patients’ data confidentially. In a re-
sponse to this problem, the German law has recently been
changed [13, 14]. Hospitals are now explicitly obliged to
collaborate with LHAs on the collection of surveillance
data. This will facilitate data collection for LHAs in the
future.
Another issue that we identified was the inability to
discriminate between hospital and community acquired
MRSA infections for many of the notifications. This is
due to low levels of data completeness for the dates of
disease onset and of hospital admission, which are often
used to identify hospital acquired infections. From the
current surveillance system, it is also impossible to deter-
mine whether patients were transferred from other insti-
tutions where transmission might also have occurred,
prior to hospitalization. We suggest this should be cap-
tured by the surveillance system, as it is for example the
case in the English or US American system [15, 16].
This study had some limitations due to a possible se-
lection bias. The selection of the LHAs was not random,
but based on voluntary participation. However, 10% of
LHAs were included in the study and their selection was
purposefully diverse with the inclusion of small and large
LHAs in rural and urban areas in Germany with low
and high MRSA incidence. Due to voluntary participa-
tion, the results may not represent the view of less inter-
ested LHAs that might have more or less problems with
the surveillance system than the interviewed sites. How-
ever, analysis of interviews with LHAs as well as SHAs
showed that there were no more new aspects introduced
during later rounds of interviews suggesting that data
saturation had been reached. In addition, we presented
the results to LHAs and SHAs at a conference and at
meetings asking for their comments, which were gener-
ally consenting.
Conclusions
In summary we found the surveillance system for invasive
MRSA infections to be useful, timely, and well accepted
with mostly good data quality and to be fulfilling its aims.
Reducing the amount of information to be collected by
LHAs could make the system simpler and less resource-
intensive without impacting on its usefulness and may
even increase its acceptance especially in LHAs.
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Table 3 Recommendations for improving statutory MRSA
surveillance; Germany 2016/2017
Attribute assessed Recommendations for improvement
Simplicity • Reducing variables on clinical symptoms
• Use data collection forms
• Deposit data collection forms with IPC team
of hospital
• Clarify that hospitals are obliged legally to
collaborate with LHAs on data collection
Data quality • Clarify that hospitals are obliged legally to
collaborate with LHAs on data collection
• Include variables to be able to discriminate
between hospital and community acquired
infections
Timeliness • None
Acceptability • Reducing variables on clinical symptoms
Usefulness • LHA with regulatory supervision should
investigate and check on IPC measures in
hospital
• Include variables to be able to discriminate
between hospital and community acquired
infections
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